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Abstract
We investigate the possible existence of asymmetries among Euro Area countries re-
actions to the European Central Bank monetary policy. Our analysis is based on a
Structural Dynamic Factor model estimated on a large panel of Euro Area quarterly vari-
ables. We find that, despite the single monetary policy has had the effect of reducing
heterogeneity in impulse responses, member states still react asymmetrically in terms of
prices and unemployment, while no difference appears in terms of output. These results
are the consequence of country specific structures, rather than of European Central Bank
policies.
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1 Introduction
Before the introduction of the common currency, every Euro Area (EA) member state’s cen-
tral bank had a different attitude towards the objectives of containing inflation and boosting
economic growth (Clarida et al., 1998; Mihov, 2001). After 1999 the European Central Bank
(ECB) took over national central banks and imposed a common monetary policy. Nowa-
days, all EA countries are subject to this single policy, but are still characterized by different
economic structures, legislations, fiscal policies, and levels of public debt. Such a diversi-
fied environment makes the ECB decision process particularly challenging as member states’
reaction to its policies might be different from country to country.
It is then natural to ask if there is any asymmetry in how single EA countries respond
to the common monetary policy decided by the ECB. This is an important question both
from the ECB and from member states’ perspective. Indeed, while the ECB has to take into
account possible asymmetries in order to avoid instabilities within the EA, member states have
to consider their reaction to monetary policy before setting appropriate national policies.
The monetary transmission mechanism in the EA has been already investigated in the
literature, both at the aggregate level (Monticelli and Tristani, 1999; Peersman and Smets,
2003; Cecioni and Neri, 2011) and among countries (Mojon and Peersman, 2003; Peersman,
2004) by means of Structural VAR (SVAR) models. In spite of some exceptions (Clements
et al., 2001; Ciccarelli and Rebucci, 2006; Rafiq and Mallick, 2008), a substantial consensus is
reached by these studies on excluding asymmetric effects of monetary policy across member
states.
In this paper we use a different approach. We study how single EA countries respond to
ECB decisions by estimating a Structural Dynamic Factor model estimated on a large panel
of EA quarterly time series spanning the period from 1983 to 2007. We find that, although the
introduction of the euro has changed the monetary transmission mechanism in the individual
countries towards a more homogeneous response, EA countries react asymmetrically to the
common monetary policy in terms of prices and unemployment, while no difference appears
in terms of output. We conclude that these differences are the consequence of country specific
structures rather than of ECB policies, and hence they should be addressed by means of
national fiscal policies, regulation, and structural reforms.
Since the seminal contributions of Giannone et al. (2005), Bernanke et al. (2005), Stock
and Watson (2005), and Forni et al. (2009), a factor approach has been used as an alternative
to SVAR for macroeconomic analysis. One major advantage of factor models is to allow for
dealing with very large panels of data without suffering from the curse of dimensionality.
Moreover, due to strong co-movements among macroeconomic time series, factor models often
provide a realistic representation of the data by assuming the existence of few common shocks
as the main source of business cycle fluctuations. In the present context, this implies the
possibility of disentangling EA-wide from country specific shocks: a desirable feature for
analyzing ECB monetary policy, which, by definition, is common to all member states.
Recent literature employed factor models to analyze EA economies although, in general,
with a different focus with respect to the present study. Sala (2003) studies the transmission
of common monetary policy shocks across European countries but by estimating his model
only on pre–euro data. Eickmeier and Breitung (2006) and Eickmeier (2009) conclude that
heterogeneity across EA countries is mainly a result of idiosyncratic shocks. Favero et al.
(2005) find homogeneous effects of monetary policy shocks on output gaps and inflation rates,
while McCallum and Smets (2009) find heterogeneous responses in terms of real wage. Finally,
2
Boivin et al. (2009) show that the common currency has contributed in shaping a greater
homogeneity of the monetary policy transmission mechanism across countries.
Among these papers, the study most similar to ours is Boivin et al. (2009). However,
while they are mainly interested in financial variables (bond yields, monetary aggregates, and
exchange rates), our main focus is on variables of economic activity (GDP and its components,
prices, and unemployment). Additionally, the empirical procedure of our study differs from
Boivin et al. (2009) in the choice of treatment of structural breaks, and identification of
monetary policy shocks. Hence, this paper contributes to the procedure used to estimate
a structural dynamic factor model and to identify the impact of common monetary shocks
on the economic activity of EA member states, and it also adds new evidence on possible
cross-country asymmetries in the reaction to these shocks.
In the next section we outline the econometric methodology used in the empirical analysis.
In section 3 we describe the dataset and the data transformation used, highlighting some
stylized facts related to the existence of co-movements in the EA data. In section 4 we explain
the identification strategy employed, while in section 5 we discuss country specific impulse
responses of prices, output, consumption, investment, and unemployment to the common
monetary policy shock. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Structural Dynamic Factor model
We consider here the Structural Dynamic Factor model firstly introduced by Giannone et al.
(2005), Stock and Watson (2005), and Forni et al. (2009), which is a development of the model
originally proposed by Stock and Watson (2002) and Bai (2003), and it is a particular case
of the generalized dynamic factor model by Forni et al. (2000) and Forni and Lippi (2001).
Similar models were also proposed by Sargent and Sims (1977), Geweke (1977), Chamberlain
and Rothschild (1983), and Bernanke et al. (2005).
We assume that there exist two kind of sources of business cycle fluctuations in the national
EA economies: (i) few structural shocks common to all countries and affecting the whole EA
(e.g. monetary policy or oil shocks), and (ii) many idiosyncratic shocks (capturing for example
country/regional/sectoral specific dynamics) having only marginal effects on the whole Area.
Within this framework we consider a shock as common if it has a non-negligible effect over
all EA economies, while we consider a shock as idiosyncratic if it affects only some countries
or some sectors. This representation is indeed very realistic: think, for example, of a national
shock having only limited, although maybe non-null, effects outside the country where it
originated, or to sectoral-specific effects as in constructions or manufacturing.
Each stationary time series xit, i = 1, . . . , n and t = 1, . . . , T , where n is the number
of variables and T is the sample length, is written as the sum of two mutually orthogonal
unobservable components which account for the two sources of fluctuations: (i) the common
component χit and (ii) the idiosyncratic component ξit. The common component χit is a
linear combination of r ≤ n common factors fkt, k = 1, . . . , r, which are in turn driven by
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q ≤ r common shocks ujt, j = 1, . . . , q.1 Formally:
xit = χit + ξit, (1)
χit =
r∑
k=1
λikfkt = λ
′
ift, (2)
A(L)ft = Hut, (3)
where λi is an r-dimensional vector of factor loadings, A(L) is an r×r matrix lag polynomial,
H is an r × q matrix, ut, with ut ∼ iid(0, I), is the q-dimensional vector containing the
common shocks which are orthogonal also to the idiosyncratic components at any lead and
lag. The idiosyncratic components can be mildly cross sectionally correlated, while, provided
that stationarity is ensured, no assumption is made on their serial correlation properties.2
As proved by Forni et al. (2009), consistent estimation of (1)-(3), as both n and T go to
infinity, and assuming both q and r are known, can be achieved in three steps. First, the factors
fkt and the corresponding loadings in (2) are estimated by means of principal components.
Second, A(L) in (3) is estimated by running a VAR on the estimated factors. Finally, given
the residuals obtained from the VAR estimation, the common shocks are estimated as the q
largest principal components of the residuals, while H is estimated by projecting the residuals
on the estimated shocks.3
From (1)-(3) we can write each observed macroeconomic variable as:
xit =
q∑
j=1
bij(L)ujt + ξit = bi(L)ut + ξit,
where
bi(L) = λ
′
iA
−1(L)H, (4)
are the impulse response functions of the common component of the i-th variable to the q
common shocks. In this paper, we are just interested in the impulse response functions to
the common shock representing the ECB monetary policy. Given its pervasive nature, the
monetary policy shock is assumed to be one of the q common shocks ujt and we denote it as
umpt . Without loss of generality, we assume the shock of interest to be the first one, so that
the vector of common shocks is ut = (u
mp
t , u2t, . . . , uqt)
′ and the impulse response functions
(4) are written as
bi(L) = b
mp
i (L) +
q∑
j=2
bij(L),
and we focus only on the first term on the right hand side. However, it is well known that,
unless additional restrictions are imposed, only the space spanned by the common factors is
identified. As a consequence, impulse responses and common shocks in (4) are identified only
up to multiplication by a q× q rotation matrix R. In the present context, in order to achieve
1The literature has often referred to fkt as the static factors, while to ujt as dynamic factors. For a formal
treatment of the model presented in this section see Forni et al. (2009).
2The literature refers to this model as the approximate factor model to be distinguish from the exact
factor model which is characterized by cross-sectionally-dynamically uncorrelated idiosyncratic component,
i.e. ξit ∼ iid(0, 1).
3Other estimation methods for model (1)-(3) have been proposed in Doz et al. (2011a,b).
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identification, we impose economically meaningful restrictions as those in Forni et al. (2009),
Forni and Gambetti (2010a), and Luciani (2012).4
Finally, in order to account for estimation uncertainty, we build confidence intervals using
a bootstrap algorithm as in Bernanke et al. (2005) and Eickmeier (2009). At each iteration
d, we bootstrap the estimated common shocks u˜dt and we generate new common factors as
f˜dt = Â
∗−1(L)Ĥu˜dt , where the ∗ indicates that, as in Kilian (1998), we correct for the distortion
induced by the VAR estimation on the common factors. We then estimate the parameters of
equation (3) and identify the shocks as described in section 4, thus obtaining new bootstrapped
impulse response functions.5
Collecting together all admissible impulse responses (the one on the sample and those on
the bootstrap) gives a distribution of impulse responses from which we can get point estimates
and confidence bands by computing the median and relevant percentiles.
2.1 Structural Dynamic Factor models in the Euro Area
EA economic history is characterized by two different institutional frameworks separated by
the fixing of exchange rates in January 1999. These two exchange rate regimes are likely to
have determined a structural break in the data around 1999:Q1. For this reason, we assume
the existence of a structural break in our data and we take it into account by proceeding as
follows:
1. we estimate the Structural Dynamic Factor model on a panel of 237 quarterly series
from 1983:Q1 to 2007:Q4 in order to have consistent estimates of the space spanned by
the common factors ft and consequently of the space spanned by the common shocks ut;
2. we re-estimate the loadings λi for the pre-euro sample (1983:Q1-1998:Q4) and for the
euro sample (1999:Q1-2007:Q4) separately;
3. we identify the monetary policy shock separately over the two subsamples.6
This procedure is justified on the basis of two results. On the one hand, Breitung and
Eickmeier (2011) prove that in presence of a structural breaks, factor loadings λi may be
inconsistently estimated. On the other hand, Stock and Watson (2002) demonstrate that the
space spanned by the common factors ft can still be estimated consistently if there is limited
time variation in the loadings. The latter is a reasonable assumption in the context of EA, as
the introduction of a single currency was indeed a gradual process which started in February
1992 with the Maastricht Treaty, and continued with the launching of the fixed exchange
rate regime in January 1999 and the creation of the ECB, as established by the Treaty of
Amsterdam effective since May 1999.
4Let R be a rotation matrix such that RR′ = I, and let ci(L) = bi(L)R, and t = R′ut, then the model
xit = ci(L)t + ξit is observationally equivalent to model (1)-(3). As in SVARs, structural shocks and impulse
response functions are unique up to an orthogonal transformation (i.e. a rotation) and structural analysis in
the present context becomes analogous to the standard structural analysis in VARs.
5As demonstrated by Bai and Ng (2006), when N  T the estimated factors can be treated as if they
are directly observed rather than estimated, and hence inference on impulse responses can be conducted by
ignoring the idiosyncratic component.
6Since Weber et al. (2011) find that the transmission mechanism of monetary policy was similar before
1996 and after 1999 but different during the transition period 1996-1998, as a robustness check we perform our
analysis on the subsample 1983-1996 rather than 1983-1998. Results are identical to the one obtained with
our benchmark specification, and are available in a complementary appendix to this paper.
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Given their relevance for our analysis, we need to formally test these assumptions on the
behavior of the common factors and their loadings. In order to do so, we first run a CUSUM
Square test on the common factors (Brown et al., 1975) and find no significant structural
change (figure 1). Then, we run the structural break test of Breitung and Eickmeier (2011) on
the factor loadings, which indicates structural break on January the 1st 1999 for all the series
of interest (table 1). These results are consistent with Canova et al. (2012) and Breitung and
Eickmeier (2011).
2.2 Testing for asymmetries
In order to evaluate the presence of significant differences across impulse responses we should
test the null-hypothesis of no differences. Olivei and Tenreyro (2010) propose a procedure to
test for differences among impulse responses in VAR models. Their test consists in computing
differences among observed impulse responses and then compare them with a distribution of
distances obtained from data simulated from two different VARs. Unfortunately, this test is
unfeasible in our case. Indeed, while Olivei and Tenreyro (2010) aim at comparing impulse
responses of the same variable, but estimated from two different (VAR) models, we are in-
terested in comparing responses of different variables, but estimated from the same (factor)
model. Hence, in our case we should be able to simulate data from a factor model in which
all impulse responses are equal. Building such a distribution would lead to a degenerate dis-
tribution in which all distances among impulse responses are zero, i.e. a useless distribution
for making inference.
Therefore, in order to have an approximate measure of asymmetries, we rely on a simple
procedure with a clear intuitive meaning. In particular, for each bootstrap, we compute the
difference between the individual country response and the Euro Area response. These gives
us a distribution of differences between impulse responses. We consider the difference non
significant if zero is contained within the confidence bands.7 A similar procedure is used also
by Fielding and Shields (2011).
3 Model setup
3.1 Data and data treatment
Data include EA aggregates, main macroeconomic variables for single EA member states, and
key indicators for the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan. The database contains
9 aggregate EA variables: GDP, CPI, short and long term rates, monetary aggregates (M1 and
M3), unit labor cost, real effective exchange rate, and the dollar/euro exchange rate. These
aggregate variables are taken either from Eurostat, or from ECB, and, when necessary, they
are backdated by using data from the Area Wide Model Database (Fagan et al., 2001).
We then have 35 variables for Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, 34 for France and
Spain, and 31 for Belgium. Variables included for these countries are: interest rates, monetary
aggregates, real effective exchange rate, an index of stock prices, GDP and its expenditure
components, unemployment rate, unit labor costs, GDP deflator, producer price index, CPI
together with its disaggregated categories, retail sales, and number of cars sold. In addition, we
also include CPI, GDP, and interest rates for smaller EA countries (Finland, Greece, Ireland,
Luxembourg, and Portugal), and for UK, US, and Japan, as well as the spot oil price.
7We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting us this testing procedure.
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Summing up, our datasets consists of 237 quarterly time series covering the period 1983Q1–
2007Q4.8 The complete list of variables, sources, and the transformations used is available in
Appendix A.
A comment is necessary on the way we transform data in order to make them station-
ary. According to Uhlig (2009), the co-movements found by Boivin et al. (2009) in a similar
dataset, are actually the result of the autocorrelation induced in the transformed data. As a
consequence, the existence of a factor structure, based on co-movements among series, would
be just a by-product of data treatment. In order to cope with this critique, and compared
with Boivin et al. (2009), we adopt a different set of transformations. As in Stock and Watson
(2005) and Forni and Gambetti (2010c), we take second differences of the log of both prices
and monetary aggregates, first differences of interest rates, and, when needed, growth rates are
computed on a quarterly basis.9 We label this kind of transformations as heavy, in contrast
with light transformations used by Boivin et al. (2009). In the latter case interest rates are
kept in levels, the first difference of log of prices and monetary aggregates is taken, and, most
importantly, growth rates are computed on a yearly basis.
With reference to Uhlig (2009) critique, our choice of heavy transformations is justified
by table 2, where we report selected percentiles of the distribution of the absolute value of
univariate autocorrelations when considering light vs. heavy transformations. The median
autocorrelation from lags 1 to 4 is between 0.36 and 0.15 in the heavy case, while it is between
0.86 and 0.28 in the light case. Similar results hold also for other percentiles.
3.2 Number of common shocks and factors
After transforming data, we rely on specific tests and information criteria for determining the
number of common factors r and common shocks q. The latter is estimated by means of the
test proposed by Onatski (2009), which suggests q ∈ {4, 5} (table 3) and the criterion by
Hallin and Liška (2007) suggesting q ∈ {2, 3}. We choose as our baseline specification q = 4,
i.e. the average of these results.10
One possible way of fixing the number of common factors is to choose r such that the
variance explained by the factors is equal to the variance explained by the chosen q shocks.
This heuristic method suggests 13 factors (see table 5). An alternative is to resort to the
criterion provided by Bai and Ng (2002), and its refinement by Alessi et al. (2010), both
suggesting either 9 or 14 factors. We choose as our baseline specification r = 12, i.e. the
8The sample starts in 1983 because of two main reasons. First, not all the series in the database, especially
at the single European country level, are available before 1983. Second, although EA data at the aggregate
level are available since 1970 at a quarterly frequency, by comparing alternative aggregation methods, Bosker
(2006) shows that differences in EA artificial data are prominent before 1983 especially for inflation and interest
rates, while vanishing thereafter.
9It is worth to note that, within the literature on money demand in the EA (Papademos and Stark, 2010,
and reference therein), it is common practice to treat monetary aggregates as I(2) variables. Furthermore,
Beyer (2009) and Dreger and Wolters (2010), among others, show that inflation is an important determinant
in describing a stable long run money demand equation for the EA, thus indicating that money growth and
inflation are cointegrated, and therefore I(1) variables.
10It is also worth noting that four common shocks is a parameterization considered plausible in the literature.
In particular, in her discussion of Boivin et al. (2009), Reichlin (2009) rises some doubts about their choice
of seven common shocks by arguing that a smaller number of common shocks would be much more plausi-
ble: “when macroeconomists think of common shocks, they mention productivity, money, time preference, or
government, and it is difficult to think of many other candidates” (p. 130).
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average of what the mentioned criteria suggest.11
In table 4 we show the share of variance accounted for by the estimated common compo-
nent. When looking at the post-1999 sample, we find that 91% of aggregate GDP and 90% of
aggregate CPI fluctuations are imputable to the common component. These values decrease
if we look at country specific GDP, CPI, and unemployment rate, but are still considerably
high in the majority of the cases, notwithstanding the heterogeneity and large dimension of
the dataset at hand. Indeed, the variance of the common component is more than 60% of
total GDP fluctuations for all countries but Belgium (59%), Finland (54%), Portugal (45%),
Ireland (12%), and Greece (44%), while it is more than 70% of total CPI fluctuations for
all countries but Finland (60%), Portugal (70%), and Greece (54%), and more than 50% of
total unemployment fluctuations for all countries but Belgium (47%) and Italy (36%). When
averaging common variances across all 237 considered variables, we have that the common
component account for 51% of the total fluctuations.
The existence of cross-country heterogeneity in the co-movements both justifies our ap-
proach (co-movements imply a factor structure), and motivates our research question (hetero-
geneity suggests asymmetric reactions).
4 Identification of the monetary policy shock
We identify the monetary policy shock by means of sign restrictions (Faust, 1998; Canova
and de Nicolò, 2002; Uhlig, 2005), an identification strategy also used in the context of factor
models by Eickmeier (2009) and Forni and Gambetti (2010b,c). Specifically, at each iteration
we draw a vector of q(q − 1)/2 angles ω from a uniform distribution on [0, 2pi), which, by
means of Givens transform, are used to construct an orthogonal matrix R(ω) of dimension
q × q. We then compute the associated impulse responses and if they satisfy a prescribed set
of sign restrictions (to be specified below) we accept the draw, otherwise we discard it. We
stop this procedure once K draws are accepted.
We rely on the following assumptions imposed only on EA variables for the first two lags:
after a contractionary monetary policy shock the short term interest rate, the real effective
exchange rate, and the dollar/euro exchange rate increase, while GDP, CPI, and M1 decrease.
These restrictions, which are theoretically consistent with a typical IS-LM model of an open
economy, are commonly accepted in the literature (Peersman, 2005; Farrant and Peersman,
2006). Moreover, the choice of imposing restrictions only on the EA variables makes the
identification scheme agnostic on the responses of single countries (see also Eickmeier, 2009,
for a similar identification scheme).
In order to compute impulse responses and the related confidence intervals, we use the
procedure described in section 2 with 500 bootstrap draws. To keep computations feasible,
for each of the 500 + 1 samples we save K = 10 rotation matrices. Then, for each sample we
select just one rotation matrix as suggested by Fry and Pagan (2011).12
11Other criteria, not used in this paper, to determine q or r are in Bai and Ng (2007), Amengual and Watson
(2007), Onatski (2010), and Kapetanios (2010). Results for the criteria by Bai and Ng (2002), Hallin and Liška
(2007), and Alessi et al. (2010), as well as robustness analysis for for q = {3, 5} and r = {9, 13}, are available
in a complementary appendix to this paper.
12Fry and Pagan (2011) point out that for each sample the distribution of the R(ω) that satisfies the sign
restrictions represents model uncertainty. However, when computing impulse responses with confidence bands
what matters is sampling uncertainty, not model uncertainty. Hence they suggest selecting for each sample
just one rotation, namely the one which produces the impulse response closest to the median response.
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An alternative strategy to identify monetary policy is to adopt a recursive identification
scheme, i.e. the Cholesky decomposition as in Boivin et al. (2009) and Forni and Gambetti
(2010a). Although recently criticized (Canova and Pina, 2005; Carlstrom et al., 2009; Uhlig,
2009; Castelnuovo, 2011, 2012a), this is the simplest, and perhaps, still, the most diffused
identification scheme in SVAR literature (Christiano et al., 1999; Peersman and Smets, 2003;
Weber et al., 2011). The main problem of this identification scheme is that it relies on zero
short-run restrictions which are too binding and not necessarily based on economic theory.
Differently, by using sign restrictions, we are imposing restrictions often used implicitly in
empirical analysis to validate the results, and consistent with macroeconomic models. How-
ever, if the shock of interest explains a marginal fraction of the forecast error of the variables
of interest, the outcome of the exercise conducted with sign restrictions should also be taken
cautiously (for a Monte Carlo experiment, see Paustian, 2007; Castelnuovo, 2012b). For these
reasons, in Appendix B we show also results obtained with Cholesky identification.
5 Results
In this section we present impulse response functions to a monetary policy shock. The shock
is normalized so that on impact it raises EA short term rate of 50 basis points, we thus report
impulse responses of selected variables both at the aggregate level, and at the country level.
In figures 2-7 we show the impulse responses of CPI, GDP, together with consumption and
investment, and unemployment rate. Each figure contains the impulse responses, together with
68% confidence bands, estimated both on the pre-euro sample (grey solid line, and shaded
area), and on the euro-sample (black solid and dashed lines).
Figure 2 shows impulse responses for the aggregate EA variables used in the identification
of the monetary policy shock and it should be considered just as validation of our identification
strategy. In both samples, output, prices, and the monetary aggregate M1 respond negatively,
while the short term rate and exchange rates respond positively.13 When comparing pre-euro
with euro sample impulse responses of aggregate CPI and GDP, we find that the introduction
of the common currency amplified the response of CPI, while reducing the reaction of GDP.
This result is consistent with an increase in prices’ flexibility due to greater competition
between EA industries.14
We then move to the analysis of country specific variables. In figure 8 we show results of
the test on the asymmetries introduced in section 2.2. In each plot of figure 8 the grey/black
straight line is the median difference between the response of a given country and the response
of a benchmark country, while the shaded area/dashed lines is/are the 68% confidence bands
estimated on the pre-euro/euro sample. If at horizon h the zero is contained within the confi-
dence bands, it means that the impulse response of a given country and that of a benchmark
country are not statistically different at horizon h. In panels (a) and (b) the benchmark
13Although the magnitude of the estimated responses may seem too large, it is in fact in line with the
literature (Monticelli and Tristani, 1999; Sala, 2003; Eickmeier, 2009). Detailed information on the magnitude
of the impulse responses estimated by the literature cited in this paper can be found in the complementary
appendix.
14It may be argued that, since before 1999 there was no common monetary policy, the relevant comparison
would be between pre–1999 Bundesbank monetary policy, and post–1999 ECB monetary policy (Sala, 2003).
Hence, as a robustness check we estimated our model by imposing in the pre–1999 sample the identifying
restrictions on the German short term interest rate. Results are near identical to the one obtained with our
benchmark specification, and are available in a complementary appendix to this paper.
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country is the EA, while in panels (c), (d), and (e) the benchmark country is Germany,
The goal is to understand whether there are asymmetries in the transmission mechanism
of the common monetary policy to EA countries before and after 1999, and to understand
which was the effect, if any, of the common monetary policy on the existing asymmetries.
5.1 Cross-country differences before 1999
Prices. Four countries out of ten (Finland, Italy, Portugal, and Greece) exhibit a positive
reaction (figure 3). In addition to the four countries just mentioned, also the impulse responses
of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands are statistically different from those of the EA (figure
3.a) thus showing a high degree of pre-euro heterogeneity in prices.
GDP. All countries, but Greece, react as predicted by economic theory (figure 4). The
unconventional response of Greece seems to be related with the low percentage of variance of
Greek GDP explained by the common component (see table 4). Indeed, it should be noted
that Greece was not part of the European Monetary System, as it only joined it in stage II,
i.e. in 1999. When testing for asymmetries (figure 8.b) we find that also the reactions of
Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal are statistically different than
those of the EA thus showing a high degree of heterogeneity pre-euro in output.
Consumption. All countries display the expected negative path (figure 5). However, when
testing for asymmetries (figure 8.c) some differences emerge since both France and the Nether-
lands react significantly less than Germany, while Italy and Spain react significantly more.
Investment. All countries react as predicted by economic theory (figure 6) and all react
significantly differently than Germany (figure 8.d).
Unemployment Rate. Unemployment in Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium
follows a similar hump–shaped path, while impulse responses for Spain and Italy are different
(figure 7). However, when testing for asymmetries (figure 8.e) we find that also France, and
the Netherlands, react in a significantly different way than Germany.
5.2 Cross-country differences after 1999
Prices. We can divide EA countries in three groups (see figure 3). In the first, we have
countries for which we observe the expected negative response to the common monetary policy
shock: Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Finland. In the second group, we have countries
for which we estimate a mute response (i.e. not significantly different from zero): Ireland,
Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Greece. Finally, the third group is composed of a single country for
which we estimate a positive response, namely Portugal (see also Sala, 2003; Eickmeier, 2009).
If we consider these results with reference to pre-euro impulse responses, the introduction of a
common currency appears to have had a positive role in shaping homogeneity across countries
CPIs. Table 4 provides an explanation of this switch in terms of explained variances of the
common components: the higher this number, the more impulse responses are homogeneous.
However, significant asymmetries persist between the EA and Finland, Italy, Portugal and
Greece (figure 8.a), with Finland reacting more than the EA, and Italy, Portugal, and Greece
reacting less. The response of the Mediterranean countries seem likely to be the consequence
of price rigidities and of lack of competition.
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GDP. Impulse responses are quite similar across countries (figure 4). With respect to the
pre-euro sample, the response of Greek GDP has now the expected negative sign. Overall, the
introduction of the euro has helped in reducing asymmetries. However, small differences are
still present between the EA and the Netherlands, Ireland, and Portugal (figure 8.b). While
Ireland and Portugal GDP fluctuations are mainly idiosyncratic (table 4), the strong reaction
of Dutch GDP seems to be driven by consumption.
Consumption. The Netherlands and Italy display the deepest reaction in consumption with
a minimum of roughly -5% and -3% respectively (figure 5), a result also found by Reichlin
(2009) in the case of Italy. The response of Netherlands consumption is likely due to the
particular dynamics of the series which has nothing to do with monetary policy. Indeed, from
1999 to 2003 the year on year consumption growth trended downward as a consequence of
firms’ and households’ balance sheets adjustments, weak profits, and lower purchasing power of
households. Germany, Belgium and Spain also show a significant contraction in consumption
up to -1%, while the response is mute for France. The introduction of the euro has slightly
reduced asymmetries for Italy and Spain (figure 8.c).
Investment. The reaction of investment is more homogeneous with the main exception of
Germany for which a contraction up to -9% is observed (figure 6). This result is likely due to
the dynamics of the German construction sector, as the housing market was characterized by a
post-reunification boom-bust cycle in residential investment (Knetsch, 2010). This anomalous
response of Germany implies significant differences with respect to all other countries (figure
8.d), which, however, have all similar responses.
Unemployment Rate. As in the pre-euro sample, all countries but Italy and Spain show
similar reactions (figure 7). However, asymmetries are reduced between Germany and France
and the Netherlands (figure 8.e). More in detail, on the one hand Spanish unemployment rate
experiments a stronger boost than other countries, on the other hand, Italian unemployment
seems not to respond to a common monetary policy shock. The first finding suggests large
elasticity of Spanish labor market to monetary policy shocks likely due to the high share of
fixed term contracts in the labor market (see for example Güell and Petrongolo, 2007). In
contrast, the mute response of Italian unemployment is the consequence of a rigid labor market
which seems not to be related at all to the business cycle as confirmed from the low correlation
(-0.07) between changes in unemployment rate and GDP growth.15
6 Discussion and conclusions
In this paper we ask the following question: is there any asymmetry in how single EA countries
respond to the common monetary policy decided by the ECB?
In order to answer we estimate a Structural Dynamic Factor model on a large panel of EA
quarterly time series spanning the period from 1983 to 2007. The dataset incorporates data
on the aggregate EA as well as country-specific key economic variables, such as gross domestic
product, inflation, unemployment, consumption, investment, and many others.
We find that, although the introduction of the euro has changed the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism in the individual countries towards a more homogeneous response, differences
15Correlations for other countries are: Belgium -0.27, France -0.36, Germany -0.29, the Netherlands -0.26,
and Spain -0.34.
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still remain between North and South Europe in terms of prices and unemployment. Due to
their idiosyncratic nature, these differences can hardly be controlled by means of the com-
mon monetary policy, rather they should be addressed by means of national fiscal policies,
regulation, and structural reforms. Indeed, while before 1999 CPI responses were highly asym-
metric, the introduction of the euro and of the single monetary policy, and the consequent
increase in integration and competition within the EA, made prices more flexible thus re-
sponding more homogeneously to changes in interest rate. The remaining asymmetries are
observed in the Mediterranean countries, which historically have less flexible prices and lack
of market competition. Similarly, the asymmetries in labor markets seem to be the result of
structural and socio-economic characteristics of single countries. This is the case for exam-
ple with the rigid labor market structure in Italy, which makes Italian unemployment rate
completely non-reactive unresponsive to the single monetary policy.
In conclusion, EA countries react asymmetrically to the common monetary policy in terms
of prices and unemployment, while no difference appears in terms of output. While the post-
1999 reduction in asymmetries is consistent with the aims of the ECB (see Boivin et al.,
2009), the remaining differences are beyond the scope of monetary policy, and they should be
addressed by means of national reforms. As demonstrated by the recent/current public debt
crisis, and by the skyrocketing of government bond spreads, these differences pose a threat to
the region’s stability: addressing them is fundamental for the future of Europe, and it should
be a priority if economic cohesion is to be achieved.
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Tables
Table 1: Testing for Structural Break in the Factor Loadings:
Breitung and Eickmeier Test
BG FR GE IT NL ES FI GR IE PT EA
Consumer Price Index 63.44 71.35 72.50 55.46 60.86 63.32 41.56 37.75 48.56 57.69 80.68
Gross Domestic Product 81.41 74.14 76.29 54.57 58.66 79.83 70.87 30.82 39.30 45.10 88.59
Consumption 70.35 55.96 65.19 66.52 34.19 56.59
Investment 49.91 66.55 52.65 51.76 48.81 68.91
Unemployment Rate 66.52 55.61 34.15 47.61 54.45 48.21
This table show the LM Statistic for the null of no structural break in the factor loadings on January the 1st 1999. This statistic
is asymptotically distributed as a χ2 random variable with r (number of factors degrees of freedoms. The 10%, 5%, and 1% critical
values are 18.5493, 21.0261, and 26.2170 respectively.
Table 2: The Distribution of Autocorrelations
Light vs. Heavy
Percentile Lag
light 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
5 0.65 0.40 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02
25 0.81 0.57 0.32 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.07
50 0.86 0.67 0.47 0.28 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.16
75 0.90 0.78 0.65 0.51 0.43 0.36 0.32 0.29
95 0.95 0.87 0.78 0.70 0.64 0.58 0.54 0.51
heavy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
5 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
25 0.24 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04
50 0.36 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.10
75 0.54 0.32 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.18 0.18 0.16
95 0.90 0.74 0.59 0.50 0.39 0.35 0.30 0.33
Percentiles of the distribution of univariate autocorrelation functions when computing
light transformations as in Boivin et al. (2009) or heavy transformations, i.e. by replacing
yearly with quarterly growth rates and taking first differences of interest rates and second
differences of the log of prices and monetary aggregates.
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Table 3: Determining the Number of Common Shocks:
Onatski Test
q0 vs. q1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 0.029 0.050 0.069 0.088 0.104 0.121 0.135 0.151
1 0.271 0.487 0.626 0.321 0.372 0.421 0.465
2 0.608 0.677 0.262 0.321 0.372 0.421
3 0.390 0.195 0.262 0.321 0.372
4 0.108 0.195 0.262 0.321
5 0.947 0.923 0.343
6 0.623 0.257
7 0.142
This table shows p-values of the null of q0 common shocks against the alternative of q0 <
q ≤ q1 common shocks. The Discrete Fourier Transformation of the data is computed for
ωj = 2pisj/T , with sj ∈ [2, ..., 20], thus to includes waves between 1 and 12 years.
Table 4: Comovements in the Euro Area
Explained Variance
Country GDP CPI UR
83-98 99-07 83-98 99-07 83-98 99-07
Euro Area 0.85 0.91 0.79 0.90 - -
Germany 0.71 0.76 0.69 0.80 0.48 0.69
France 0.74 0.78 0.49 0.82 0.55 0.60
Netherlands 0.31 0.73 0.73 0.75 0.54 0.58
Belgium 0.66 0.59 0.55 0.81 0.58 0.47
Finland 0.63 0.54 0.31 0.60 - -
Italy 0.42 0.66 0.70 0.82 0.50 0.36
Spain 0.38 0.66 0.62 0.90 0.67 0.57
Portugal 0.67 0.45 0.51 0.70 - -
Ireland 0.39 0.12 0.33 0.72 - -
Greece 0.20 0.44 0.18 0.54 - -
For each country we report the variance explained by the common component
of GDP, CPI, and Unemployment Rate (UR). For each variable the first column
refers to the 1983:Q1-1998:Q4 (pre-euro) sample, and the second column to the
1999:Q1-2007:Q4 (euro) sample. Values are given on a scale between 0 (no
contribute of the common component) and 1.
Table 5: Cumulated Explained Variance:
Number of Factors
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
q 0.21 0.34 0.43 0.51 0.58 0.64 0.68 0.73 0.76 0.79 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.88
r 0.09 0.16 0.23 0.27 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.40 0.42 0.45 0.47 0.49 0.51 0.53
The table shows the percentage of overall variance explained by the first q common shocks estimated with the method of dynamic
principal components as in Forni et al. (2000), and the first r static factors estimated by static principal components. Variance is
measured on a scale between 0 and 1.
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Figures
Figure 1: CUSUM Square Test on the Static Factors
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Solid line is the CUSUM Square statistic of (Brown et al., 1975), while the dashed lines
are the 90% confidence bands computed using critical values as given in Durbin (1969)
and Edgerton and Wells (1994).
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Figure 2: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock
Euro Area Aggregates
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Solid line is the estimated impulse responses for the 1999:Q1-2007:Q4 (euro) subsample
with 68% bootstrap confidence band (dashed). Shaded area is the 68% confidence band
for the 1983:Q1-1998:Q4 (pre-euro) subsample.
Figure 3: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock
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Solid line is the estimated impulse responses for the 1999:Q1-2007:Q4 (euro) subsample with 68% bootstrap confidence band
(dashed). Shaded area is the 68% confidence band for the 1983:Q1-1998:Q4 (pre-euro) subsample.
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock
Gross Domestic Product
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Solid line is the estimated impulse responses for the 1999:Q1-2007:Q4 (euro) subsample with 68% bootstrap confidence band
(dashed). Shaded area is the 68% confidence band for the 1983:Q1-1998:Q4 (pre-euro) subsample.
Figure 5: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock
Consumption
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Solid line is the estimated impulse responses for the 1999:Q1-2007:Q4 (euro) subsample
with 68% bootstrap confidence band (dashed). Shaded area is the 68% confidence band
for the 1983:Q1-1998:Q4 (pre-euro) subsample.
Figure 6: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock
Investment
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Solid line is the estimated impulse responses for the 1999:Q1-2007:Q4 (euro) subsample
with 68% bootstrap confidence band (dashed). Shaded area is the 68% confidence band
for the 1983:Q1-1998:Q4 (pre-euro) subsample.
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Figure 7: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock
Unemployment Rate
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Solid line is the estimated impulse responses for the 1999:Q1-2007:Q4 (euro) subsample
with 68% bootstrap confidence band (dashed). Shaded area is the 68% confidence band
for the 1983:Q1-1998:Q4 (pre-euro) subsample.
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Figure 8: Quantifying Asymmetries
Distance from benchmark country
(a) Consumer Price Index
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(b) Gross Domestic Product
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(c) Consumption
0 10 20
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
France
0 10 20
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
Netherlands
0 10 20
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
Belgium
0 10 20
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
Italy
0 10 20
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
Spain
(d) Investments
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(e) Unemplyment Rate
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In each plot, the grey/black straight line is the median difference between the response of a given country and the
response of a benchmark country, while the shaded area/dashed lines is/are the 68% confidence bands estimated
on the pre-euro/euro sample. If at horizon h the zero is contained within the confidence bands, it means that the
impulse response of a given country and that of a benchmark country are not statistically different at horizon h.
In panels (a) and (b) the benchmark country is the EA, while in panels (c), (d), and (e) the benchmark country is
Germany,
24
Appendix A The Euro Area dataset
Belgium
N dsmnemonic Variable Source Unit F. SA T
1 BGOCFGDPD GDP (REAL) OEO 2004Mile Q 1 3
2 BGOCFPCND PRIVATE CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE (REAL) OEO 2004Mile Q 1 3
3 BGOCFINVD GFCF (REAL) OEO 2004Mile Q 1 3
4 BGOCFEGSD EXPORTS OF GOODS & SERVICES (REAL) OEO 2004Mile Q 1 3
5 BGOCFIGSD IMPORTS OF GOODS & SERVICES (REAL) OEO 2004Mile Q 1 3
6 BGOCFDGDE GDP - IPD OEO 2004=100 Q 1 4
7 BGOCFDCNE PRIVATE CONSUMPTION - IPD OEO 2004=100 Q 1 4
8 BGOCFDINE GROSS DOMESTIC FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION - IPD OEO 2004=100 Q 1 4
9 BGOCFEPCE EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES - IPD OEO 2004=100 Q 1 4
10 BGOCFIPCE IMPORTS OF GOODS & SERVICES - IPD OEO 2004=100 Q 1 4
11 BGOSLI12O PASSENGER CAR REGISTRATIONS MEI Thous. M 1 3
12 BGOBS076Q BTS: MANUFACTURING, Capacity Utilization Judg. MEI % Q 1 2
13 BGOCFEMPO EMPLOYMENT OEO Thous. Q 1 3
14 BGOCFUNRQ UNEMPLOYMENT RATE OEO % Q 1 2
15 BGOULC..T UNIT LABOUR COSTS - TOTAL (TREND) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
16 BGOULCC.T U.L.C. - CONSTRUCTION (ISIC F) (TREND) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
17 BGOULCM.T U.L.C. - MANUFACTURING (ISIC D) (TREND) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
18 BGOULCS.T U.L.C. - MARKET SERVICES (ISIC GK) (TREND) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
19 BGOULCF.T U.L.C. - FINANCIAL & BUSINESS SERVICES (ISIC JK)(TR) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
20 BGOCC011 REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES MEI 2005=100 M 0 3
21 BGOSLI15G TOTAL RETAIL TRADE (VOLUME) MEI 2005=100 M 1 3
22 BGOPP017F PPI MANUFACTURED GOODS MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
23 BGOCP049F CPI - HARMONISED MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
24 BGOCP042F CPI All items non-food non-energy MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
25 BGOCP041F CPI Energy MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
26 BGOCFISTR INTEREST RATE - SHORT TERM OEO % Q 0 2
27 BGOCFILTR INTEREST RATE - LONG TERM OEO % Q 0 2
28 BGOSP001F BEL SHARE PRICES ALL SHARES † MEI 2005=100 M 0 3
29 BGOLC007E HOURLY EARNINGS MALES: INDUSTRY(DISC.) MEI 2005=100 Q 1 3
30 BGM1....A M1 (EXCL. CURR IN CIRC.) CURN ‡ NCB Mile M 2 4
31 BGM3....A M3 (EXCL. CURR IN CIRC.) CURN ‡ NCB Mile M 2 4
† Series backdated by data in Eickmeier (2009)
‡ Series backdated by Eurostat "DS-070950 Former series for euro area countries on monetary aggregates and credit"
France
N dsmnemonic Variable Source Unit F. SA T
32 FROCFGDPD GDP (REAL) OEO 2000Mile Q 1 3
33 FROCFPCND PRIVATE CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE (REAL) OEO 2000Mile Q 1 3
34 FROCFINVD GFCF (REAL) OEO 2000Mile Q 1 3
35 FROEX003D Government final consumption expenditure MEI 2000Milechd Q 1 3
36 FROCFEGSD EXPORTS OF GOODS & SERVICES (REAL) OEO 2000Mile Q 1 3
37 FROCFIGSD IMPORTS OF GOODS & SERVICES (REAL) OEO 2000Mile Q 1 3
38 FROCFDGDE GDP - IPD OEO 2005=100 Q 1 4
39 FROCFDCNE PRIVATE CONSUMPTION - IPD OEO 2005=100 Q 1 4
40 FROCFDINE GROSS DOMESTIC FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION - IPD OEO 2005=100 Q 1 4
41 FROCFEPCE EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES - IPD OEO 2005=100 Q 1 4
42 FROCFIPCE IMPORTS OF GOODS & SERVICES - IPD OEO 2005=100 Q 1 4
43 FROSLI05O TOTAL CAR REGISTRATIONS MEI Thous. M 1 3
44 FROBS076Q BTS: MANUFACTURING, Capacity Utilization Judg. MEI % Q 1 2
45 FROCFEMPO EMPLOYMENT OEO Thous. Q 1 3
46 FROCFUNRQ UNEMPLOYMENT RATE OEO % Q 1 2
47 FROULC..T UNIT LABOUR COSTS - TOTAL (TREND) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
48 FROULCC.T U.L.C. - CONSTRUCTION (ISIC F) (TREND) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
49 FROULCM.T U.L.C. - MANUFACTURING (ISIC D) (TREND) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
50 FROULCS.T U.L.C. - MARKET SERVICES (ISIC G K) (TREND) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
51 FROULCF.T U.L.C. - FINANCIAL & BUSINESS SERVICES (ISIC J K)(TR) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
52 FROCC011 REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES MEI 2005=100 M 0 3
53 FROSLI15G TOTAL RETAIL TRADE (VOLUME) MEI 2005=100 M 1 3
54 FROPP017F PPI Manufactured products MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
55 FROCP049F CPI - HARMONISED MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
56 FROCP042F CPI NON FOOD NON ENERGY MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
57 FROCP019F CPI Food MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
58 FROCP041F CPI ENERGY MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
59 FROCP054F CPI Rent MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
60 FROCFISTR INTEREST RATE - SHORT TERM OEO % Q 1 2
61 FROCFILTR INTEREST RATE - LONG TERM OEO % Q 1 2
62 FROSP001F FRA SHARE PRICES SBF 250 MEI 2005=100 M 0 3
63 FROLC007E HOURLY WAGE RATE: INDUSTRY(DISC.) MEI 2005=100 Q 1 3
64 FRM1....A M1 (NATIONAL CONTRIBUTION TO M1) NCB Mile M 2 4
65 FRM3....A M3 (NATIONAL CONTRIBUTION TO M3) NCB Mile M 2 4
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Germany
N dsmnemonic Variable Source Unit F. SA T
66 BDOCFGDPD GDP (REAL) OEO 2000Mile Q 1 3
67 BDOCFPCND PRIVATE CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE (REAL) OEO 2000Mile Q 1 3
68 BDOCFINVD GFCF (REAL) OEO 2000Mile Q 1 3
69 BDOEX003D GOVERNMENT FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE MEI 2000Milechd Q 1 3
70 BDOCFEGSD EXPORTS OF GOODS & SERVICES (REAL) OEO 2000Mile Q 1 3
71 BDOCFIGSD IMPORTS OF GOODS & SERVICES (REAL) OEO 2000Mile Q 1 3
72 BDOCFDGDE GDP - IPD OEO 2000=100 Q 1 4
73 BDOCFDCNE PRIVATE CONSUMPTION - IPD OEO 2000=100 Q 1 4
74 BDOCFDINE GROSS DOMESTIC FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION - IPD OEO 2000=100 Q 1 4
75 BDOCFEPCE EXPORTS OF GOODS & SERVICES - IPD OEO 2000=100 Q 1 4
76 BDOCFIPCE IMPORTS OF GOODS & SERVICES - IPD OEO 2000=100 Q 1 4
77 BDOSLI05O TOTAL CAR REGISTRATIONS MEI Thous. M 1 3
78 BDOBS076Q BTS: MANUFACTURING, Capacity Utilization Judg. MEI % Q 1 2
79 BDOCFEMPO EMPLOYMENT OEO Thous. Q 1 3
80 BDOCFUNRQ UNEMPLOYMENT RATE OEO % Q 1 2
81 BDOULC..T UNIT LABOUR COSTS - TOTAL (TREND) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
82 BDOULCC.T U.L.C. - CONSTRUCTION (ISIC F) (TREND) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
83 BDOULCM.T U.L.C. - MANUFACTURING (ISIC D) (TREND) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
84 BDOULCS.T U.L.C. - MARKET SERVICES (ISIC GK) (TREND) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
85 BDOULCF.T U.L.C. - FINANCIAL & BUSINESS SERVICES (ISIC JK)(TR) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
86 BDOCC011 Real Effective Exchange Rate MEI 2005=100 M 0 3
87 BDOSLI15G TOTAL RETAIL TRADE (VOLUME) MEI 2005=100 M 1 3
88 BDOPP017F PPI Manufacturing Industry MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
89 BDOCP049F CPI - HARMONISED MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
90 BDOCP042F CPI Non-food non-energy MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
91 BDOCP019F CPI Food + alcohol-free drinks (excl rest) / Index publicati MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
92 BDOCP041F CPI - ENERGY (EXCL. GASOLINE BEFORE 1991) MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
93 BDOCP053F CPI Housing - rental services MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
94 BDOCFISTR INTEREST RATE - SHORT TERM OEO % Q 1 2
95 BDOCFILTR INTEREST RATE - LONG TERM OEO % Q 1 2
96 BDOSP001F SHARE PRICES CDAX MEI 2005=100 M 0 3
97 BDOLC007E HOURLY EARNINGS: MANUFACTURING MEI 2005=100 Q 1 3
98 BDM1....A M! - GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO EURO M1 NCB Bile M 2 4
99 BDM3....A M3 - GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO EURO M3 NCB Bile M 2 4
Italy
N dsmnemonic Variable Source Unit F. SA T
100 ITOCFGDPD GDP (REAL) OEO 2000Mile Q 1 3
101 ITOCFPCND PRIVATE CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE (REAL) OEO 2000Mile Q 1 3
102 ITOEX004D GFCF MEI 2000Milechd Q 1 3
103 ITOEX003D GOVERNMENT FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE MEI 2000Milechd Q 1 3
104 ITOCFEGSD EXPORTS OF GOODS & SERVICES (REAL) OEO 2000Mile Q 1 3
105 ITOCFIGSD IMPORTS OF GOODS & SERVICES (REAL) OEO 2000Mile Q 1 3
106 ITOCFDGDE GDP - IPD OEO 2000=100 Q 1 4
107 ITOCFDINE GROSS DOMESTIC FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION - IPD OEO 2000=100 Q 1 4
108 ITOCFDCNE PRIVATE CONSUMPTION - IPD OEO 2000=100 Q 1 4
109 ITOCFEPCE EXPORTS OF GOODS & SERVICES - IPD OEO 2000=100 Q 1 4
110 ITOCFIPCE IMPORTS OF GOODS & SERVICES - IPD OEO 2000=100 Q 1 4
111 ITOSLI05O TOTAL CAR REGISTRATIONS MEI Thous. M 1 3
112 ITOBS076Q BTS: MANUFACTURING, Capacity Utilization Judg. MEI % Q 1 2
113 ITOCFEMPO EMPLOYMENT OEO Thous. Q 1 3
114 ITOCFUNRQ UNEMPLOYMENT RATE OEO % Q 1 2
115 ITOULC..T UNIT LABOUR COSTS - TOTAL (TREND) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
116 ITOULCC.T U.L.C. - CONSTRUCTION (ISIC F) (TREND) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
117 ITOULCM.T U.L.C. - MANUFACTURING (ISIC D) (TREND) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
118 ITOULCS.T U.L.C. - MARKET SERVICES (ISIC GK) (TREND) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
119 ITOULCF.T U.L.C. - FINANCIAL & BUSINESS SERVICES (ISIC JK)(TR) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
120 ITOCC011 REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE - CPI BASED MEI 2005=100 M 0 3
121 ITRETTOTF IT RETAIL SALES NADJ X X M 2 3
122 ITOPP017F PPI(DISC.) MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
123 ITOCP049F CPI - HARMONISED MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
124 ITOCP042F CPI - EXCLUDING FOOD & ENERGY MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
125 ITOCP019F CPI - FOOD MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
126 ITOCP041F CPI - ENERGY MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
127 ITOCP057F CPI - HOUSING MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
128 ITOCFISTR INTEREST RATE - SHORT TERM: 3 MONTH EURIBOR OEO % Q 0 2
129 ITOCFILTR INTEREST RATE - LONG TERM: 10 YR TREASURY BONDS OEO % Q 0 2
130 ITOSP001F SHARE PRICES - ISE MIB STORICO MEI 2005=100 M 0 3
131 ITOLC007E HOURLY WAGE RATE : INDUSTRY(DISC.) MEI 2005=100 M 1 3
132 ITM1....A M1 - ITALIAN CONTRIBUTION TO EURO M1 NCB Mile M 2 4
133 ITM3....A M3 - ITALIAN CONTRIBUTION TO EURO M3 NCB Mile M 2 4
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Netherlands
N dsmnemonic Variable Source Unit F. SA T
134 NLOCFGDPD GDP (REAL) OEO 2001Mile Q 1 3
135 NLOCFPCND PRIVATE CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE (REAL) OEO 2001Mile Q 1 3
136 NLOCFINVD GFCF (REAL) OEO 2001Mile Q 1 3
137 NLOCFEGSD EXPORTS OF GOODS & SERVICES (REAL) OEO 2001Mile Q 1 3
138 NLOCFIGSD IMPORTS OF GOODS & SERVICES (REAL) OEO 2001Mile Q 1 3
139 NLOCFDGDE GDP - IPD OEO 2001=100 Q 1 4
140 NLOCFDCNE PRIVATE CONSUMPTION - IPD OEO 2001=100 Q 1 4
141 NLOCFDINE GROSS DOMESTIC FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION - IPD OEO 2001=100 Q 1 4
142 NLOCFEPCE EXPORTS OF GOODS & SERVICES - IPD OEO 2001=100 Q 1 4
143 NLOCFIPCE IMPORTS OF GOODS & SERVICES - IPD OEO 2001=100 Q 1 4
144 NLOSLI12O PASSENGER CAR REGISTRATIONS MEI Thous. M 1 3
145 NLOBS076Q BTS: MANUFACTURING, Capacity Utilization Judg. MEI % Q 1 2
146 NLOCFEMPO EMPLOYMENT OEO Thous. Q 1 3
147 NLOCFUNRQ UNEMPLOYMENT RATE OEO % Q 1 2
148 NLOULC..T U.L.C. - TOTAL (TREND) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
149 NLOULCC.T U.L.C. - CONSTRUCTION (ISIC F) (TREND) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
150 NLOULCM.T U.L.C. - MANUFACTURING (ISIC D) (TREND) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
151 NLOULCS.T U.L.C. - MARKET SERVICES (ISIC GK) (TREND) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
152 NLOULCF.T U.L.C. - FINANCIAL & BUSINESS SERVICES (ISIC JK)(TR) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
153 NLOCC011 REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES MEI 2005=100 M 0 3
154 NLOSLI15G TOTAL RETAIL TRADE (VOLUME) MEI 2005=100 M 1 3
155 NLOPP017F PPI MANUFACTURING MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
156 NLOCP049F CPI - HARMONISED MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
157 NLOCP042F CPI ALL ITEMS NON FOOD-NON ENERGY MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
158 NLOCP019F CPI FOOD MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
159 NLOCP041F CPI ENERGY MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
160 NLOCP053F CPI RENT INCL. IMPUTED RENT MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
161 NLOCFISTR INTEREST RATE - SHORT TERM OEO % Q 0 2
162 NLOCFILTR INTEREST RATE - LONG TERM OEO % Q 0 2
163 NLOSP001F SHARE PRICES ALL SHARES INDEX MEI 2005=100 M 0 3
164 NLOLC007E HOURLY WAGE RATE MANUFACTURING(DISC.) MEI 2005=100 M 1 3
165 NLM1....A M1 NCB Mile M 2 4
166 NLM3....A M3 NCB Mile M 2 4
Spain
N dsmnemonic Variable Source Unit F. SA T
167 ESOCFGDPD GDP (REAL) OEO 2000Mile Q 1 3
168 ESOCFPCND PRIVATE CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE (REAL) OEO 2000Mile Q 1 3
169 ESOCFINVD GFCF (REAL) OEO 2000Mile Q 1 3
170 ESOCFEGSD EXPORTS OF GOODS & SERVICES (REAL) OEO 2000Mile Q 1 3
171 ESOCFIGSD IMPORTS OF GOODS & SERVICES (REAL) OEO 2000Mile Q 1 3
172 ESOCFDGDE GDP - IPD OEO 2000=100 Q 1 4
173 ESOCFDCNE PRIVATE CONSUMPTION - IPD OEO 2000=100 Q 1 4
174 ESOCFDINE GROSS DOMESTIC FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION - IPD OEO 2000=100 Q 1 4
175 ESOCFEPCE EXPORTS OF GOODS & SERVICES - IPD OEO 2000=100 Q 1 4
176 ESOCFIPCE IMPORTS OF GOODS & SERVICES - IPD OEO 2000=100 Q 1 4
177 ESOSLI12O PASSENGER CAR REGISTRATIONS MEI Thous. M 1 3
178 ESOBS076Q BTS: MANUFACTURING, Capacity Utilization Judg. MEI % Q 1 2
179 ESOCFEMPO EMPLOYMENT OEO Thous. Q 1 3
180 ESOCFUNRQ UNEMPLOYMENT RATE OEO % Q 1 2
181 ESOULC..T UNIT LABOUR COSTS - TOTAL (TREND) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
182 ESOULCC.T U.L.C. - CONSTRUCTION (ISIC F) (TREND) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
183 ESOULCM.T U.L.C. - MANUFACTURING (ISIC D) (TREND) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
184 ESOULCS.T U.L.C. - MARKET SERVICES (ISIC GK) (TREND) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
185 ESOULCF.T U.L.C. - FINANCIAL & BUSINESS SERVICES (ISIC JK)(TR) MEI 2005=100 Q 0 3
186 ESOCC011 REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES MEI 2005=100 M 0 3
187 ESOPP017F PPI Manufacturing - proxy PPI All Items MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
188 ESOCP049F CPI - HARMONISED MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
189 ESOCP042F CPI/NONFOOD/NONENERGY MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
190 ESCPFDTBF ES CPI - FOOD AND NON-ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES NADJ X 2006=100 M 2 3
191 ESOCP041F CPI ENERGY MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
192 ESOCP057F CPI RENT MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
193 ESOCFISTR INTEREST RATE - SHORT TERM OEO % Q 0 2
194 ESOCFILTR INTEREST RATE - LONG TERM OEO % Q 0 2
195 ESSHRPRCF MADRID S.E - GENERAL INDEX MEH 31/12/85=100M 0 3
196 ESOLC007E HOURLY EARNINGS: INDUSTRY EXCL. CONSTR. (DISC.) MEI 2005=100 Q 1 3
197 ESM1....A M1 - SPANISH CONTRIBUTION TO EURO M1 † NCB Mile M 2 4
198 ESM3....A M3 - SPANISH CONTRIBUTION TO EURO M3 † NCB Mile M 2 4
† Series backdated by Eurostat "DS-070950 Former series for euro area countries on monetary aggregates and credit"
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Other Countries
N Country dsmnemonic Variable Source Unit Freq.SA T
199 FNOCFGDPD GDP (REAL) OEO 2000Mile Q 1 3
200 Finland FNOCP049F CPI - HARMONIZED MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
201 FNOCFISTR INTEREST RATE - SHORT TERM OEO Percentage Q 0 2
202 FNOCFILTR INTEREST RATE - LONG TERM OEO Percentage Q 0 2
203 GROCFGDPD GDP (REAL) OEO 1995Mile Q 1 3
204 Greece GROCP049F CPI - HARMONIZED MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
205 GROCFISTR INTEREST RATE - SHORT TERM OEO Percentage Q 0 2
206 IROCFGDPD GDP (REAL) OEO 2004Mile Q 1 3
207 Ireland IROCP049F CPI - HARMONIZED MEI 2005=100 M 2 2
208 IRI60B.. MONEY MARKET RATE IFS Percentage M 0 2
209 IROCFILTR INTEREST RATE - LONG TERM OEO Percentage Q 0 2
210 Luxembourg LXOCFGDPD GDP (REAL) OEO 2000Mile Q 1 3
211 LXOCP049F CPI - HARMONIZED MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
212 PTOCFGDPD GDP (REAL) OEO 2000Mile Q 1 3
213 Portugal PTOCP049F CPI - HARMONIZED MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
214 PTOCFISTR INTEREST RATE - SHORT TERM OEO Percentage Q 0 2
215 PTOCFILTR INTEREST RATE - LONG TERM OEO Percentage Q 0 2
216 UKOCFGDPD GDP (REAL) OEO 2003Mil.£ Q 1 3
217 United UKOCP049F CPI - HARMONIZED MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
218 Kingdom UKOCFISTR INTEREST RATE - SHORT-TERM OEO Percentage Q 0 2
219 UKOCFILTR INTEREST RATE - LONG-TERM OEO Percentage Q 0 2
220 JPOCFGDPD GDP (REAL) OEO 2000MilU Q 1 3
221 Japan JPCPIGLAF CPI: GENERAL MIAC 2005=100 M 2 4
222 JPOCFISTR INTEREST RATE - SHORT TERM OEO Percentage Q 0 2
223 JPOCFILTR INTEREST RATE - LONG TERM OEO Percentage Q 0 2
224 USOCFGDPD GDP (REAL) OEO 2000Mil$ Q 1 3
225 United USOCP009F CPI ALL ITEMS MEI 2005=100 M 2 4
226 States USOCFISTR INTEREST RATE - SHORT-TERM OEO Percentage Q 0 2
227 USOCFILTR INTEREST RATE - LONG-TERM OEO Percentage Q 0 2
228 EAESNGDPD GDP † EUR Bile2000chd Q 1 3
229 EMCP....F CPI - HARMONISED‡ EUR 2005=100 M 2 4
230 Euro EMESEFI3R 3-MONTH INTEREST RATES (AVERAGE) † EUR Percentage M 0 2
231 Area EMESEFIGR LONG TERM GOVERNMENT BOND YIELDS † EUR Percentage M 0 2
232 EKEBLBCSE UNIT LABOUR COSTS - TOTAL ECONOMY † ECB 2000=100 Q 1 3
233 EMECBM1.A MONEY SUPPLY: M1 (EP) ECB Bile M 2 4
234 EMECBM3.A MONEY SUPPLY: M3 (EP) ECB Bile M 2 4
235 EMECBEXGR REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE † ECB 1990=100 Q 0 3
236 World USESXECU US DOLLAR TO ECU (MEAN) EUR $/e M 0 3
237 UKI76AAZA MARKET PRICE - UK BRENT IFS $ M 0 3
† Series backdated by using the AWM database data
‡ DS calculated before 1990
List of Abbreviations
Source Transformations Seasonally Adjustement
NCB - National Central Bank 1 none 0 Not Seasonally Adjusted
MEI OECD Main Economic Indicators 2 ∆ 1 Seasonally Adjusted
OEO OECD Economic Outlook 3 ∆ log 2 SA with dummy variables regression
ECB European Central Bank 4 ∆∆ log
IFS IMF International Financial Statistics 5 log
EUR Eurostat
MEH Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda
MIAC Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
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Appendix B Robustness analysis: Cholesky identification scheme
Following Forni and Gambetti (2010a), let B(q)(L) be the q×q sub-matrix of B(L) correspond-
ing to the impulse responses of EA aggregate GDP, CPI, short term rate, and real effective
exchange rate. The Cholesky Identification scheme consists in identifying the monetary policy
shock by selecting the rotation matrix R such that B(q)(0) is lower triangular. That is, we
assume that output and prices do not react contemporaneously to monetary policy shocks.
This is a standard recursive scheme, with the monetary policy shock being the third shock
(see Forni and Gambetti, 2010a, for a similar identification scheme using US data).
Figure B1: Impulse Response Functions
Cholesky Identification Scheme
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Solid line is the estimated impulse responses for the 1999:Q1-2007:Q4 (euro) subsample with 68%
bootstrap confidence band (dashed). Shaded area is the 68% confidence band for the 1983:Q1-1998:Q4
(pre–euro) subsample.
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Figure B2: Impulse Response Functions
Cholesky Identification Scheme
(a) Consumer Price Index
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(b) Gross Domestic Product
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Solid line is the estimated impulse responses for the 1999:Q1-2007:Q4 (euro) subsample with 68% bootstrap confidence band
(dashed). Shaded area is the 68% confidence band for the 1983:Q1-1998:Q4 (pre–euro) subsample.
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Figure B3: Impulse Response Functions
Cholesky Identification Scheme
(a) Consumption
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(b) Investments
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(c) Unemplyment Rate
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Solid line is the estimated impulse responses for the 1999:Q1-2007:Q4 (euro) subsample with 68% bootstrap confi-
dence band (dashed). Shaded area is the 68% confidence band for the 1983:Q1-1998:Q4 (pre–euro) subsample.
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Figure B4: Quantifying Asymmetries
Cholesky Identification Scheme
(a) Consumer Price Index
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(b) Gross Domestic Product
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(c) Consumption
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(d) Investments
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(e) Unemplyment Rate
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In each plot, the grey/black straight line is the median difference between the response of a given country and the
response of a benchmark country, while the shaded area/dashed lines is/are the 68% confidence bands estimated
on the pre-euro/euro sample. If at horizon h the zero is contained within the confidence bands, it means that the
impulse response of a given country and that of a benchmark country are not statistically different at horizon h.
In panels (a) and (b) the benchmark country is the EA, while in panels (c), (d), and (e) the benchmark country is
Germany, 32
